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We study an evolutionary version of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, where the agents are
placed in a random graph. For lattices with fixed connectivity, α, we show that for low values
of α the final density of cooperating agents depends on the initial conditions, while it does not
depend for high connectivity lattices. We fully characterized the phase diagram of the system, using
both, extensive numerical simulations and analytical computations. It is shown that two different
behaviors are well defined: a Nash equilibrium one, where the density of cooperating agents ρc
is fixed, and a non-stationary one, where ρc fluctuates in time. Moreover we study lattices with
fluctuating connectivities and find that the phase diagram previously developed looses its meaning.
In fact, multiple transitions appear and only one regime may be defined. This regime is completely
characterized by a non stationary state where the density of cooperating agents varies in time.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg,84.35.+i,87.23.Ge,02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
The search for models able to account for the complex
behavior in many biological, economical and social sys-
tems has lead to an intense research activity in the last
years [1]. In particular, a very debated issue is the emer-
gence of cooperation between competitive individuals [2]
a problem that was first analyzed by Alxerod [3] in the
context of the Game Theory [4].
Game Theory was originally developed to find the op-
timal strategy for a given game between two intelligent
players. However, its straightforward development in-
volved the generalization toward the iterated games of
N players. In this context many theories have been pro-
posed to explain the emergence and sustainability of co-
operation, kin selection [5], reciprocal altruism [6], group
selection [7] and others.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is the archetype model
of reciprocal altruism [8]. In the game, each player has
two options: to defect, or to cooperate. The defector will
always have the highest reward T (temptation to defect)
when playing against the cooperator which will receive
the lowest payoff S (sucker value). If both cooperate
they will receive a payoff R (reward for cooperation),
and if both defect they will receive a payoff P (punish-
ment). Moreover, these four payoffs satisfy the following
inequalities:
T > R > P > S (1)
T + S < 2R
It is not too hard to recognize that for rational play-
ers, in a two players-one round game the choice of defec-
tion will assure the largest payoff for each player inde-
pendently of the other decision (Nash Equilibrium) [9].
This situation, however, creates a dilemma for intelligent
players, they know that mutual cooperation results in a
higher income for both of them. The question is then un-
der which conditions cooperation emerges in this game.
Nowak and May [10] have shown how cooperation can
emerge between players with memoryless strategies in the
presence of spatial structure (Spatial Prisoners Dilemma,
SPD). They considered a deterministic cellular automa-
ton where agents are placed in a square lattice with self,
nearest and next-nearest interaction. At each round of
the game, the payoff of the player is the sum of the pay-
offs she got in her encounters with her neighbors. The
state of the next generation is defined occupying the site
of the lattice with the players having the highest score
among the previous owner and the immediate neighbors.
It was remarkable the fact that within these simple rules,
for a certain range of values of the pay-off matrix, very
complex spatial patterns show -up with cooperators and
defectors coexisting.
Since then, the game has been largely extended or
modified to study more complex situations. For exam-
ple, Szabo et al. studied the influence of the tic-for-tat
strategy [11] and the effects of the external constraint
[12] in the game. Vainstein and Arenzon [13] approached
the problem considering site-diluted lattices to mimic the
presence of disorder in the environment and proved that,
depending on the amount of disorder, cooperation can
be enhanced. Moreover, Abramson and Kuperman [14]
and Kim and colaborators [15] studied the consequences
of different topologies and proved that defectors are en-
hanced in small-world networks. Furthermore, Ebel and
Bornholdt [16] studied the response of the system upon
perturbations finding different regimes for avalanche dy-
namics.
2In this work, we try to extend previous results of other
authors [17] and to put them in a more general frame-
work. To this end we decided to study the model in a
random graph [18]. The introduction of a random graph
may be interpreted as a first step to better characterize
the disordered nature of the interactions in evolutionary
systems, the extension to more complex networks[18] will
be the subject of a forthcoming work. Moreover, while
loosing the notion of bi-dimensional or three-dimensional
space, we get a very simple way to tune the number of
interacting agents.
We study two type of random lattices, in the first one,
usually called a Bethe lattice, all the sites have a fixed
and equal number of neighbors, α while the other one, is
a lattice where the number of links per site is Poissonian
distributed with a mean value α.
We show, that for lattices with fixed connectivity the
density of cooperating agents develops multiple jumps
as a function of the temptation (T ) of the agents, and
that depending of the connectivity these jumps may lead
also to a region of the phase space where the density of
cooperating agents, ρc, fluctuate. These transitions are
very well characterized and we show that they can be
predicted by the simple study of the interaction between
clusters of cooperating and defeating agents. However,
for Poissonian lattices the situation is more complex, the
number of transitions becomes infinite in the thermo-
dynamic limit, and we don’t find a stationary state of
cooperating agents.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In
the next section we present the model with all its details.
Then, the numerical results for the lattices with fixed
connectivities are presented, together with a comparison
of the analytical predictions for the phase diagram. In
the next section we present the results for lattices with
fluctuating connectivities and finally the conclusions are
presented.
II. MODEL
The model is defined by placing two kind of agents, co-
operators (C) or defectors (D), in a random lattice, with
fixed or fluctuating connectivities (as mentioned above)
and considering that the connected pairs interact through
the following payoff matrix
D C
D 0 T
C 0 1
TABLE I: Nowak’s payoff matrix for one player. D-defector,
and C-cooperator
where C stand for cooperator and D for defector and
where the temptation T satisfies 1 < T < 2 which is
consistent with equation (1).
The agents will interact simultaneously and indepen-
dently from each other and the agent payoff will be the
sum of the payoffs that she wins in her interaction with
all her neighbors.
The evolution of the system proceeds as follows: First,
each site is occupied by a cooperator (C) with a proba-
bility p, or by a defector (D) with a probability 1 − p.
Then, the agents interact following the above payoff ma-
trix, and in the next time step, in every site i of the lattice
we will place the agent with the higher payoff between
the neighbors of i and i itself. The time t is then defined
as the number of generations between the current one
and the first. The process is repeated, erasing the later
payoffs, until the system stabilizes.
In this way our model reproduces a deterministic in-
teraction between memoryless agents. The only source
of randomness comes from the lattice structure and the
initial conditions p, but, as it is shown below, this is
enough to produce a very complex behavior. Therefore,
the only remaining relevant variables of our problem are
the temptation T of the agents and the connectivity α of
the lattice.
Some more variables will be useful in the discussions
below, so we will introduce them here. The state (D or
C) of site i will be characterize by a variable θi that takes
the value 1 if the agent is a cooperator and 0 otherwise.
In this way, the state of a system with N sites at time t is
fully characterized by the set of variables (θ1, θ2, . . . , θN ).
We defined also si as the number of cooperative neighbors
of the agent locate at the site i (by definition si ≤ α),
and gsiθi as the total payoff of the agent placed at site i
having si cooperating neighbors.
A simple analysis of the payoff matrix shows that the
agent’s payoff will be different from zero only when she
plays with at least one cooperator. Thus, the agent’s pay-
off depends on the number of her cooperative neighbors.
Besides, the agent’s payoff also depends on the type of
agent, if she is a cooperator, she wins 1, otherwise she
wins T for every interaction with a cooperative neighbor.
Therefore:
gsiθi = (T − (T − 1)θi)si (2)
Note that for a cooperative agent gs1 = s, while for a
defector one gs0 = Ts as pointed out before.
Other useful relations follow immediately from equa-
tion (2):
gsθ > g
s−1
θ (1 ≤ s ≤ α) (3)
and,
gα0 = max
(θ,s)
gsθ
gs0 > g
s
1 (4)
It is important to think on the system as two popula-
tions that invade each other instead of agents changing
3their behaviors during the evolution. In fact, from eq.(3),
follows that a cooperator surrounded by cooperators has
the highest payoff of her neighborhood, therefore from
the evolution rules defined above she must continue co-
operating. However, if she were free to change her be-
havior she would defect increasing her payoff and a few
time steps later all the system will be defeating and the
cooperation will never be an alternative of the players.
Finally before proceed with the presentation of the re-
sults, and for future comparisons, let us review the main
results obtained when the agents are placed in a square
lattice [10, 17]. Using periodic boundary conditions and
starting with half of the agents as cooperators and the
other half as defectors (p = 0.5) it was noticed that as
function of the temptation, the spatial game has three
qualitative different final states: The first one, for low
temptations (1 < T < 4/3), is characterized by a station-
ary or slightly periodical ρc that become a global major-
ity (ρc > 0.5). The second, for intermediate temptations
(4/3 < T < 3/2), is characterized by a non stationary
ρc(t) and spatiotemporal chaos [10, 17], and a third one,
for high temptations (3/2 < T < 2), characterized again
by a stationary or slightly periodical ρc but that is now
a global minority (ρc < 0.5).
III. FIXED CONNECTIVITY LATTICES
A. Phase Diagram
In figure 1 it is shown the phase diagram of the model
obtained from the simulations (black symbols) and from
analytical computations (dashed lines to be discussed be-
low) when the agents are initially distributed with prob-
ability 0 < p < 1 in the lattice. The black symbols
represent critical temptations (Tc) i.e. the temptations
values at which ρc jumps for each connectivity α. Note
the perfect coincidence between the points and the pre-
dictions, and also the fact that the phase diagram does
not depend on p, provided of course it is different from 0
and 1.
Three different regimes are very well defined in this fig-
ure by the full lines. The first one (I) is characterized by
a stationary ρc, the highest for these connectivities α but
not necessarily the global majority, as in the two dimen-
sional square lattice. A second (II) is characterized by
non-stationary states. These states does not necessarily
emerge with probability 1. It means, for a given α and
a given T in this zone, it will depend on the initial dis-
tribution of the cooperators, and on the particular graph
whether this phase is observed or not. And a third (III)
regime that appears for high values of T , is characterized
by a stationary ρc that is the global minority (ρc < 0.5).
Note that for a pure PD’s game (α = 1) and for a one-
dimensional chain (α = 2) there are not transitions. For
α > 2 one can define more than one regime, and within
each regime one can observe many transitions, that cor-
respond to jumps in the value of ρc. To be illustrative
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FIG. 1: Phase Diagram for the PD game in a fixed con-
nectivity case. The dashed lines (analytic) and the symbols
(simulations) represent the points where ρc changes its value.
The full lines divide three different zones: I High values of ρc,
II Non-stationary values of ρc and III Low values of ρc.
about this point, figures 2 and 3 show the variation of
ρc as a function of the temptation T for connectivities
α = 4 and α = 5 respectively.
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FIG. 2: ρc vs T for random graphs with a fixed connectivity
α = 4. I and III characterize the zones of the phase diagram,
(see fig. 1).
For α = 4 (fig. 2) two regimes are present I and III,
and two jumps in ρc. The first jump, indeed, reflects
the transition from phase I to phase III occurring at
T = 4/3 (to be derived below), but the second one, at
T = 3/2, is a jump inside the phase III, see figure 1.
For α = 5 (fig. 3) the system is characterized by three
different phases and by four jumps in ρc, two of them are
associated to the phase transitions I-II at T = 5/4 and
II-III at T = 3/2, while the other two (T = 4/3 and
T = 5/3) are just jumps of ρc within the regimes, see
again figure 1 to locate these points.
Let us now, try to understand and to deduce the ap-
pearance of these jumps and then to explain the classifi-
cation of the regimes presented above.
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FIG. 3: ρc vs T for random graphs with a fixed connectivity
α = 5. I, II and III characterize the zone of the phase dia-
gram, see (fig. 1). In the zone II ρc is the mean value of ρc(t)
and the bars on the lines reflects the fluctuations of ρc in this
zone.
It is not hard to realize that all the dynamics of the
model is enclosed in the competition between cooperators
and defectors. The cooperators (because of their small
payoffs), to survive, must be organized in clusters. So, we
may imagine the system as a set of cooperating clusters
embedded in a sea of defectors. Then, if the boundary
of the cooperator’s cluster is strong enough it will grow,
otherwise, the cluster keeps its size or becomes smaller.
Following this analysis, it is important to point out
that in this model only phases with cooperators and de-
fectors coexisting may appear. In fact, the defective pop-
ulation can invade the whole graph (ρc = 0) if the lowest
possible payoff for a boundary defector g10 , i.e a defector
interacting with only one cooperator, is larger than the
highest possible payoff of a cooperator gα1 . From equation
(2) this may happen if T > α, but by definition T < 2,
therefore ρc > 0 for all α ≥ 2. For α = 1 the result is
obviously the original Prisoner Dilemma.
Moreover, a whole invasion of the graph by cooperating
agents is impossible because one defector surrounded by
cooperators will have the highest possible payoff gα0 , see
equation (4), and is therefore indestructible, ρc < 1.
Once the connectivity of the graph is fixed, it is inter-
esting to see what happens when the temptation T of the
agents increases. Obviously, if T = 1 the systems does
not evolve in time, it keeps its initial distribution of co-
operators and defectors. Once the temptation increases,
we may ask ourselves, at which value of T will this dis-
tribution change, or more generally at which value of T
ρc is going to change . In order to find such a behavior it
is evident that either the cooperating clusters most be-
come soft at their boundaries such that they get invaded
by the defectors, or they most become strong enough to
occupy part of the sea of defectors. Then, the condition
of equilibrium that most be satisfied by all the agents in
the boundary between cooperators clusters and defectors
is the following:
gs11 = g
s0
0 (5)
where s1 and s0 stands for the number of cooperative
neighbors of the cooperator and the defector respectively.
But from equation (2) gs11 = s1 and g
s0
0 = Ts0. Then,
Tc =
s1
s0
and since we are interested in the region T > 1, the
equation (6) implies that s1 > s0. Therefore we may
substitute s1 = α − n and s0 = α − n −m in equation
(6) to get:
Tcn,m(α) =
α− n
(α− n)−m
(6)
where obviously n < α and since T < 2, m must also
satisfy:
1 ≤ m ≤ int
(
(α− n)− 1
2
)
(7)
In this way, assigning appropriate values of n and m
to the equation (6) we characterize all the jumps of ρc
for a given α as a function of T . This is what is repre-
sented in figure 1 by dashed lines. Of course, the lines
are just guided to the eyes, and fixed values of α should
be understood when analyzing equation (6).
Going deeper in this kind of analysis we may see that,
from equations (3) and (4), the strongest cooperators
hold:
gs1 > g
s−1
0 (2 ≤ s ≤ α) (8)
which means that the defectors can not invade the clus-
ters of cooperators, or viceversa a cooperator surrounded
by s cooperators will invade all the defectors neighbors
with less than s cooperators around them. In other
words, while equation (8) holds the clusters of cooper-
ators grow inside the sea of defectors (except for α = 2,
when the winner cooperator does not have any defector
to invade). At some point the defectors loneliness in-
creases enough and they become indestructible, stopping
the propagation of cooperators.
Then, following (2), the set of inequalities (8) are sat-
isfied for the temptations:
T <
α
α− 1
(9)
that correspond to the first transition at the lowest Tc(α),
from equation (6). Below this line, appears what we
call regime I, there, ρc evolves toward a stationary state
5where it reaches, depending on the initial conditions, its
highest possible value.
On the other hand, for the temptation range:
3
2
< T < 2 (10)
the opposite condition is satisfied, i.e:
g10 < g
s
1 < g
s−1
0 (3 ≤ s < α) (11)
independently on the initial conditions and the connec-
tivity of the lattice. Now, the spreading of cooperators
over defective sites is strongly reduced and defectors dom-
inate the system. The condition (11) implies again a sta-
tionary final state. But, due to the greatest domination
of defectors, ρc reaches its lowest possible value for the
given initial conditions (regime III).
In the intermediate range appears what we call regime
II. In this regime the stability conditions (8) and (11)
with an absolute winner do not hold anymore and dy-
namics instabilities appear in the interior of the lattice.
Depending on the temptation, T , boundary sites are in-
termittently occupied by defectors or cooperators, or al-
ternatively lines of defectors travel across the cluster of
cooperators.
Moreover, note that in the phase diagram the regime
III is not only limited to values of T larger than 3/2. For
α = 4 the regime II is not present, a surprising result
if one consider that it is present in the square lattice.
Unfortunately we were not able to analytically justify
this fact, but, we are tempted to conjecture that this is a
consequence of the absence of spatial correlations in the
Bethe lattice.
Summarizing, from equations (9) and (10) we may di-
vide the phase diagram in three zones, represented by
full lines in figure 1:
I : 1 < T < α
α−1
II : α
α−1 < T <
3
2 (α > 4) (12)
III : 32 < T < 2 if α 6= 4
III : α
α−1 < T < 2 if α = 4
Another interesting question to be answer is how many
transitions we will find for a fixed connectivity when the
temptation changes.
It could be seen from figure 1, that at a given con-
nectivity αo you will find all the transitions observed in
all the previous α’s, i.e., for αo > α (equation (6)). In
order to calculate the number of transitions to each con-
nectivity (f(α)), note that, neglecting repetitions, there
are only int(α/2) new Tc values when one moves from α
to α+ 1, equation (7). But:
int
(α
2
)
=
{
α
2 α even
α−1
2 α odd
Then, taking the average:
〈
int
(α
2
)〉
=
α− (1/2)
2
we get the incremental equation
f(α+ 1)− f(α) =
α− (1/2)
2
(13)
For α > 1 and taking the initial condition f(1) = 0,
the solution of (13) is:
f(α) =
(α− 1)2
4
(14)
A quadratic expression that compares perfectly with
the results of the simulations (see fig.4).
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FIG. 4: The number of ρc transitions for a lattice with a fixed
connectivity α. The points represent the simulation results
and the line the analytical function f(α) from equation (14).
B. Connectivity and initial conditions dependence
In the previous subsection we presented numerical sim-
ulation and arguments that justify the independence of
the phase diagram from the initial conditions. Here, we
go a step further trying to understand how ρc changes
with the initial conditions and the connectivity in the
different regimes of the phase diagram.
The main interesting result to be shown is the depen-
dence of the density of cooperating agents with the ini-
tial conditions as a function of the connectivity. This
is shown in figures 5, 6 and 7 where each figure repre-
sents results for values of T characteristics of the different
regimes of the system. In each figure, the curves show for
different values of p the final value of ρc. In figure 5 and
7 ρc is a stationary value. In figure 6, ρc is the average
value of the density of cooperating agents in a fluctuating
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FIG. 5: Initial conditions dependence of ρc in regime I. From
bottom to top p varies from 0.2 to 0.9 in steps of 0.1. Note
the convergence of ρc when α > 5 and the minimum reached
by the one dimensional chain.
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FIG. 6: Initial conditions dependence of ρc at T = 5/4, regime
II. From bottom to top p varies from 0.2 to 0.9 in steps of
0.1. Note the convergence of ρc when α ≥ 5.
state (regime II), and the bars reflect the fluctuations of
ρc.
As all the figures show, independently of p, the curves
follow similar patterns for the corresponding values of T .
In figure 5, we find, first, a sharp decrease of ρc that
reaches its minimum for graphs with connectivity 2 (that
represent the one-dimensional chain) and then ρc in-
creases quickly up to α = 6 and then slower for higher
connectivities. Remarkable the fact, that all the curves
are identical for values of α greater than 5.
In figure 6 two different behaviors are very clear, first
for low connectivities we obtain curves similar to those
of figure 5 a result easily explained, in fact for α < 5
the system is still in regime I. It is more relevant the
fact that for α ≥ 5 all the results coincide (disregarding
p = 0.2, that is probably strongly affected by finite size
effects). Moreover the mean value of ρc decreases for
higher connectivities while its fluctuations increase.
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FIG. 7: Initial conditions dependence of ρc at T = 5/3, a
characteristic Tc in the third phase. Note again the conver-
gence of ρc when α ≥ 5.
Finally, figure 7 represents the behavior of the system
in the regime III. There, increasing the connectivity ρc
decreases, and again for α ≥ 5 it is difficult to distinguish
the curves.
From these figures we may extract important conclu-
sions. Independently of p the curves always follow similar
patterns that are only defined by the temptation of the
agents to defeat, and that p only defines the value of ρc.
Moreover, if the connectivity is high enough, α > 5, ρc
becomes also independent of the random initial condi-
tions and the game is fully characterized by the connec-
tivity α and T .
To understand the effects of connectivity on the game
dynamics, let us define P sθ (α) as the probability of an
agent doing θ to has s cooperative neighbors in a lattice
with connectivity α. As before θ = 1 reflects cooperation
and θ = 0 reflects defection.
Based on combinatorial arguments we find that:
P sθ (α) =
(
α
s
)
ps(1− p)α−s(pθ + (1− p)(1− θ)) (15)
Then, the following relations hold
P sθ (α) > P
s
θ (α− 1) if s > αp (16)
P s+1θ (α) > P
s
θ (α)
P s+1θ (α) > P
s
θ (α− 1)
}
if s < αp− 1 (17)
Both relations tell us that, independently of p, the
probability to have s or more cooperative neighbors in-
creases when the connectivity grows. Thus, for a given
initial condition, a larger connectivity implies an increase
of the number of cooperators linked to both kind of
agents. This leads to a local payoff increment that am-
plify the domination of the winners agents in each phase,
7therefore, explaining the behaviors shown in figures 5, 6
and 7.
In regime I, as the cooperator’s clusters can only grow,
they are strongly enhanced when the connectivity in-
crease. This is clearly what is shown in figure 5, where
for α > 2 ρc continuously increases. On the contrary, in
the regime III cooperators can hardly invade the defec-
tors, who win practically all boundary interactions (see
equation (11)). Then, from relations (16) and (17), a
connectivity increment virtually exterminates all the co-
operators in the system (see figure 7). Furthermore in
regime II, both kind of agents are enhanced when the
connectivity increases. This has two effects: the first is
to increase the cooperator’s density fluctuations and the
second to slightly reduce the mean value of the density
of cooperators (figure 6). Note also, that in figure 6, for
α < 5 we are in the regime I and therefore the explana-
tion above applies.
For α = 1 we have the simple Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game, and for α = 2 the analytic solution of the ρc
versus p is calculated in the Appendix of this work.
IV. FLUCTUATING CONNECTIVITY
LATTICES
To study lattices with fluctuating connectivities, we
assign to each vertex of the lattice a number of links
determined by a Poissonian distribution with mean α:
P (αi) =
ααi
αi!
exp (−α) (18)
For this lattices the local equilibrium conditions satis-
fied by neighboring and opposite agents remains:
gs11 = g
s0
0
with the only difference that now the connectivities α0
and α1 of both sites may be different, a situation that
must be taken in consideration during the analysis of the
phase diagram.
Following the analysis done for the fixed connectivity
case it is easy to realize that the following temptations
characterize the equilibrium conditions for the boundary
war between cooperating and defeating agents.
Tcn,m(αi) =
αi − n
(αi − n)−m
(19)
where αi = max {α0, α1}, and Tcn,m(αi) is the critical
temptation for all sites with connectivity αi.
The main difference here, comes from the large number
of possible connectivities that can be found in this kind
of lattices. In fact, equation (19) is more general than
(6). Moreover, the larger the lattice size, the larger the
values of αi’s that may be found in the lattice. Therefore
, the number of transitions defined by (19) increases with
the lattice size. In the thermodynamic limit N →∞, an
infinite number of transitions must be expected. This is
shown in figure 8, where we plot ρc vs T for different
values of N and α = 6.
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FIG. 8: ρc vs T for different graph’s sizes: N = 100 (crosses),
1000 (white circles) and 10 000 (black symbols).
Another remarkable result in this kind of lattices is
that ρc is strongly enhanced with respect to the finite
connectivity lattices (see figure 9). This in good agree-
ment with the results of [13] for square lattices with
quenched disorder. However, here it does not reflect the
topological accidents of the lattice, but its random struc-
ture. In this kind of lattices it is possible the existence
of cooperator sites with high connectivities that become
the core of a cooperator resistance at high values of T .
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FIG. 9: Comparison between ρc vs T for fixed and fluctuating
connectivity α = 6. Note that for the latest ρc is always
greater.
With respect to the phase diagram, it is important
to note that there is not a condition equivalent to the
equation (8). In fact there is always a critical tempta-
tion lower than Tc(αi) for any α > 2 and therefore the
regime I must be absent in this lattice. This means that
8cooperators will never be absolute winners. Moreover,
cooperative agents placed at sites with the largest con-
nectivities in their neighborhood may resist any growth
of the temptation and become seeds for the spreading
of cooperation. Therefore also the regime III is absent,
there is not a stationary phase where defeating agents ab-
solutely dominate over cooperating ones. In short, only
a non stationary phase similar to regime II is presented
in the whole range of T .
Finally, figures 10, 11, 12 and 13 show the initial condi-
tion and connectivity dependence of ρc for different val-
ues of T .
It is interesting that, despite of the absence of regime
I, the curves for low temptations are very similar to those
for the fixed connectivity lattices. ρc becomes indepen-
dent of p for α ≥ 5 for small values of T .
For high temptations, figure 13 shows that ρc is highly
sensitive to the initial concentration of cooperators.
The explanation of the connectivity dependence of ρc
is similar to that for the fixed connectivity lattice, see
equations (16) and (17). The increase of the connectiv-
ity enhances the winner agents, therefore, for low temp-
tations, the cooperating agents increase, while for higher
values of T the defectors dominate the game and prevent
the spreading of cooperators.
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FIG. 10: Initial condition dependence for fluctuating connec-
tivity lattice at T = 1.01. Here α is the mean connectivity
and p change from 0.2 to 0.8.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We present a study of the characteristics of the Spatial
Prisoner’s Dilemma in random lattices. For lattices with
fixed connectivities we were able to fully characterized
the phase diagram probing the existence of three differ-
ent regimes depending on the temptation of the agents
and the connectivity of the lattice but independently on
the initial conditions of the system. We also give analyti-
cal arguments to explain the appearance of these regimes.
Furthermore, for these kind of lattices we show that for
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FIG. 11: Initial condition dependence for fluctuating connec-
tivity lattice at T = 5/4. p change from 0.2 to 0.8.
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FIG. 12: Initial condition dependence for fluctuating connec-
tivity lattice at T = 3/2. p change from 0.2 to 0.8.
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FIG. 13: Initial condition dependence for fluctuating connec-
tivity lattice at T = 5/3.
connectivities larger than α = 5, also the density of co-
operating agents, ρc, is independent of the initial con-
ditions. Moreover, we give arguments that demonstrate
9that (in the thermodynamic limit) for lattices with fluc-
tuating connectivities the density of cooperating agents
changes continuously with the temptations of the agents.
Furthermore, we also showed that in this kind of lattices
only the non-stationary regime exists, independently of
the temptation, the connectivity of the lattice and the
initial conditions. We have shown that the cooperation
is strongly enhanced in comparison with the fixed con-
nectivity lattice.
APPENDIX: ESTIMATING THE DENSITY OF
COOPERATING AGENTS
It appears clear from equation (6) and figure 1 that
there are only two connectivities without transitions. For
α = 1 the problem is reduced to the standard Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, for α = 2 the agents are essentially lo-
cated on straight lines. To find the ρc dependence with
the initial condition reduces to the calculation of the frac-
tion of initial cooperating agents p that survive in their
war with the neighboring defectors, and also to determine
the new cooperators that emerge from these interactions.
It is clear that for α = 1 all the sites are links by
pairs and therefore the interaction reduces to a simple
two-person prisoner’s dilemma game. Since in this game
cooperators survive only if they are linked with cooper-
ators, ρc will be the probability to find two cooperators
linked each other. That is:
ρc = p
2 (A.1)
Note that it is true only if agents, as pointed before,
can not change their behavior (i.e. either to cooperate
or to defect), in fact, in the original prisoner’s dilemma
game the Nash equilibrium is to defect always.
Let us define, P s1s2...snθ1θ2...θn as the initial probability to
have a site θ1, with s1 cooperative neighbor, linked to a
site θ2 which s2 cooperative neighbors linked to a site θ3
with s3 cooperative neighbors, and so on, until the site
θn with sn cooperative neighbors.
Using the equation (15) we found that for two sites
(n = 2 in the above definition) this probability is
P s1s2θ1θ2 =
(
α
s1
)(
α− 1
s2 − θ1
)(
p
1− p
)s1+s2−θ1
(A.2)
(1− p)2α−1(pθ1 + (1 − p)(1− θ1))(s1θ2 + (α− s1)(1 − θ2))
For three sites it could be compute recursively from
(A.2)
P s1s2s3θ1θ2θ3 =
P s1s2θ1θ2 P
s2s3
θ2θ3
P s2θ2
f(θ1, s2, θ3) (A.3)
where
f(θ1, s2, θ3) =
(
(α− s2) + (θ1 − 1)
α− s2
)
(1−θ3)+
(
s2 − θ1
s2
)
θ3
(A.4)
Similarly an extension of (A.3) for general θ’s and n’s
is:
P s1...snθ1...θn =
P
s1...sn−1
θ1...θn−1
P
sn−1sn
θn−1θn
P
sn−1
θn−1
f(θn−2, sn−1, θn) (A.5)
For α = 2 we calculate ρc(p) using a general recur-
sive framework which proceed as follows: first, at each
generation t we found the density of cooperators with s
(0 ≤ s ≤ 2) cooperative neighbors taking into account
the density of cooperators in the preceding generation
and the number of those sites created or destroyed in the
current one. After a very cumbersome but straightfor-
ward algebra we obtain:
ρc = P
2
1+P
12
11−P
212
110−
1
2
P 2121201110−2P
11212
01110−P
212212
011110 (A.6)
and using the equations (15), (A.2) and (A.5) we may
compute these probabilities obtaining P 21 = p
3, P 1211 =
2p3(1 − p), P 212110 = 2p
4(1 − p), P 2121201110 = 2p
5(1 − p)2,
P 1121201110 = 2p
4(1 − p)3 and P 212212011110 = 2p
6(1− p)2.
Then ρc as function of p becomes:
ρc(p) = p
3(3− 8p+ 13p2 − 12p3 + 7p4 − 2p5) (A.7)
Both equations, (A.1) and (A.7), are represented in
figure 14, fitting the simulation results.
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p
FIG. 14: Analytical fit of simulation results for ρc as function
of p for α = 1 (+) and α = 2 (x)
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